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Abstract
In a quantity setting duopoly we experimentally test the ability of managerial compen-
sation schemes to provide a commitment device aiming at gaining leadership in the product
market. The novelty of our experiment is the choice between Relative Performance and
Prot-Revenue based rewards. In line with our model, the former are chosen more fre-
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1 Introduction
It is well established that in modern rms, where ownership and management are separated
(Fama and Jensen, 1983), one of the key aspects of corporate governance relates to managerial
compensation (van Witteloostuijn et al., 2007).
In this context, owners choose their managerscompensation contracts so as to motivate
them to gain a competitive advantage in the market (Murphy, 1999; Jensen et al., 2004).1
Several corporate performance measures have been associated with managerial compensation.
Early empirical studies (Baker et al., 1988; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Lambert et al., 1991)
suggest that CEO compensation is positively associated with prots and revenues. Moreover,
industry-level analyses suggest that contracts combining own prot and revenues are widely
adopted in the CEO compensation practice in US new economyrms (Nourayi and Daroca,
2008), the US electric industry (Duru and Iyengar, 1999) and the US gas utility industry
(Agrawal et al., 1991).2 There is also evidence suggesting that top executivescompensation is
based on their relative performance, i.e., a managers compensation is a combination of own
prots and the relative performance against the rivalsprots (Gibbons and Murphy, 1990;
Barro and Barro, 1990; Janakiraman et al., 1992).3 Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) and Joh
(1999) nd that contracts of this type are widely adopted both in the US and Japanese man-
ufacturing sector. Regarding the UK, Keasy (2008) suggests that relative shareholder return
growth remains the most popular performance measure linked with executive compensation.4
Despite this variety in managerial compensation practices, most of the relevant literature
1At this point, it is useful to bear in mind two alternative interpretations of delegation. According to the
rst one, following Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987), an owner hires a manager and directs him
via an appropriate incentive contract. The alternative interpretation is the one presented by Miller and Pazgal
(2002). The problem faced by the owner of each rm is to choose the best type of manager among those that
are available, while each manager is committed to behaving in a certain manner by virtue of his personality
type.Kopel and Brand (2012), examine the case in which rms deviate from prot maximization by including
stakeholder interests in their objective function. Recently, Kopel and Marini (2014) developed a model in
which a consumer cooperative was shown to prefer to pay a at compensation to a manager with an intrinsic
motivation, while a prot maximizing rm delegates through an extrinsic incentive contract.
2The strategic use of managerial compensation contracts combining own prots and revenues has been
introduced in the literature by Vickers (1985), Fershtman (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas
(1987). In this line of research, an owner has the opportunity to delegate the output decision to his manager
and by o¤ering him an appropriate compensation contract, to direct the manager to a more aggressive behavior
in the market. This forces rival rms to reduce their output.
3Miller and Pazgal (2001; 2002; 2005) formalize relative performance contracts.
4Moral hazard issues arising in a strategic delegation context are usually ignored by the relevant litera-
ture, which focusses exclusively on the use of delegation of authority from owners to managers as a credible
commitment for gaining competitive advantage in the market.
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has focused more on di¤erent explanations why delegation is used under specic assumptions
than on the choice of the compensation scheme itself. For example, Barcena-Ruiz and Espinosa
(1996) show the value of long-term commitment on a given incentive contract. González-
Maestre (2000) studies the interplay between delegation and divisionalization of the rm, while
Moner-Colonques et al. (2004) predict that multiproduct rms will adopt partial delegation. In
this paper we focus on the choice between two alternative managerial compensation schemes.
We provide a theoretical framework and experimentally test its predictions concerning the
choice between a scheme combining own prots and revenues and an alternative one based
on own prots and relative performance. Laboratory data are obtained under two alternative
settings, depending on the ability of rm owners to commit, or not, on contract types before
choosing their respective contract terms.5 This allows us to test the relative importance of
strategic commitment on specic contract types in a context for which real world data are
naturally unavailable.
The predictions of the theoretical model are the following: First, in equilibrium, rms
owners choose to compensate their managers with Relative Performance (RP ) contracts, rather
than with Prot-Revenue (PR) based ones. However, if the choice of a managerial scheme and
the contract terms is simultaneous (two-stage versus three-stage game), both options can be
an equilibrium. Second, the managerial incentive parameters set by RP -compensating owners
direct their managers relatively closer to prot-maximization than the parameters set by PR-
compensating owners do. This holds for symmetric congurations, where both rmsowners
choose to compensate their managers with contracts of the same type. The opposite holds in
asymmetric congurations where the types of contracts chosen di¤er across rival rms. And
third, rm-level output set under universal adoption of RP contracts is lower than the output
set under universal adoption of PR contracts, while in asymmetric contract congurations the
above ranking is reversed.
We tested the predictions of the theoretical model in the laboratory implementing the two-
stage and three-stage versions of the model. A total of four 36-subject sessions were run, two
under each scenario. Eighteen owner-manager pairs, labeled as rms, were randomly formed
5A key assumption in the strategic managerial delegation literature is that rmsowners commit over the
types of contracts that they choose to compensate their managers. Yet, Manasakis et al. (2010) nd that when
there is no such commitment, each type of contract is an owners best response to the rival owners contract
choice, leading to multiplicity of equilibria.
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at the beginning of each session. These pairs were kept xed throughout the 50 periods of the
session in order to encourage the development of a cooperative relationship between the agents
who formed each rm. In each period, rms were matched into pairs forming nine random
duopolies in order to preserve the one-shot nature of the market game and avoid any collusive
outcomes (Huck et al., 2004; Holt, 1985).
Our paper contributes to the literature investigating the corporate performance measures
that owners choose to compensate their managers. In a related paper, Huck et al. (2004),
study strategic managerial compensation contracts in a private duopoly. The authors adopt a
discrete strategy space where owners choose among two di¤erent contracts. The rst contract
(No-Delegation) gives managers incentives for strict own prot-maximization, while the second
contract (Delegation) gives an additional sales bonus. Given the ownerschoices regarding the
types of contracts, managers choose output from a discrete strategy space. Their experimental
evidence suggests that the delegation contract is rarely chosen. More specically, owners direct
their managers towards mere prot-maximization, with a relative frequency of more than 66%
in all treatments.
Recently, Du et al. (2013) in an experimental framework examined the use of strategic
delegation in a mixed duopoly where one owner maximizes prots and the rival maximizes
social welfare. The owners set incentive contracts that are a linear combination of prots
and sales, while the managerschoice over output is restricted to values [0,8]. They analyse
the choice of the managerial incentive parameter indirectly, by measuring the level of the
corresponding output that is chosen in the second stage by owners. Their experiment partially
veries the theoretical equilibrium of the delegation game. By taking in to account learning
e¤ects, the verication depends on owners gaining experience through prior playing training
sessions with robot managers.
We depart from these papers in several ways. First, in our experiment, owners have a
broader strategy space, regarding the types of contracts from which they choose to compen-
sate their managers. Second, owners have an almost continuous strategy space on the man-
agerial incentive parameter that weighs own prots against either own revenues or relative
performance. Third, managers select output also from an almost continuous strategy space.
By doing so, we test not only whether owners direct their managers away from strict own
prot-maximization, but also the e¤ects of contracts chosen by owners on output levels set by
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managers. Finally, the distinction between the two-stage and the three-stage scenario allows
us, rst, to contrast the two alternative motives o¤ered by the theoretical analysis for the
prevalence of RP contracts, and second, to investigate the relative importance of the owners
commitment over contracts types for their managers, before setting their respective contract
terms.
Our main nding is that under both treatments, RP contracts were more frequently chosen
by owners than PR contracts. This evidence is in line with the theory. We are also able to
contrast the two alternative motives o¤ered by the theoretical analysis for the prevalence of
RP contracts. Our experimental evidence reveals that the prevalence of RP contracts can
be fully explained by the rms ownersselection of the Pareto-superior equilibrium contract
types. This, in turn, refutes the importance of strategic commitment over contract types for
explaining the prevalence of RP contracts.
Regarding the managerial incentive parameters, our results reveal that rmsowners only
rarely chose to compensate their managers according to their own prots alone. This is in line
with the theory. Moreover, we nd that under both treatments, PR-compensating owners set
higher incentive parameters as compared to the RP -ones.
Finally, regarding the e¤ects of contract types and managerial incentive parameters on out-
put levels, our experimental evidence implies the following: First, the output levels are higher
than those predicted by the theory. This holds for all cases except for the output level set by
RP -compensated managers in asymmetric contract congurations. However, under universal
RP -rewarding contracts, which is the most frequent contract combination, this deviation is
slightly more than 10% of the predicted theoretical level. This is in line with other quantity
setting experimental markets (Huck et al., 1999) and is contrast with a sharp convergence
to equilibrium usually reported in price-setting experiments (Garcia-Gallego, 1998). Third, as
the managerial incentive parameters increase, inducing managers to focus more on own prots,
managersoutput choices become less aggressive. That is, managers set lower output when
their incentives depend more on their rmsprots and less on the alternative objectives of
revenue or relative performance. This nding is in line with the theory too.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes and briey analyzes the
theoretical model that leads to a number of hypotheses that will be tested experimentally.
Section 3 presents the experimental design. Section 4 reports the results. Finally, Section 5
4
concludes. The experimental instructions are included in the Appendix.
2 The theoretical framework
We consider a homogeneous good industry where two rms, denoted by i; j = 1; 2, i 6= j,
compete in quantities. The (inverse) demand function for the nal good is given by P (Q) =
A   Q, where Q = q1 + q2 is the aggregate output. Firms produce with constant returns to
scale technologies and have the same constant marginal cost c; with c < A. Hence rm is
prots are:
i = (A  qi   qj   c)qi (1)
In this industry, each rm has an owner and a manager. Following Fershtman and Judd
(1987), owner is a decision maker whose objective is to maximize the prots of the rm.
This could be the actual owner, a board of directors, or a chief executive o¢ cer. Managers
are agents hired by owners to make real time operating decisions concerning output. Following
Straume (2006), we consider that each manager chooses the rms output so as to maximize
his compensation which is set according to a contract provided by the owner.
Each owner compensates his rms manager according to one of the following two types of
contracts. The rst is the Prot-Revenue, PR, contract. Following Fershtman and Judd (1987)
and Sklivas (1987), under this type of contract, the compensation scheme takes a particular
form: manager i is paid in proportion to a linear combination of own prots and revenues.
More formally, under this type of contract, manager is compensation is given by:
CPRi = 
PR
i i + (1  PRi )Ri (2)
where i and Ri are rm is prots and revenues respectively, and PRi is the managerial
incentive parameter which is chosen optimally by rm is owner so as to maximize his prots,
with 0  PRi  1. If PRi < 1, rm is owner directs his manager away from strict prot-
maximization towards including consideration of revenues and thus, manager i becomes a more
aggressive seller in the market. The higher the PRi is, the higher is the weight that owner i
puts on own prots. If PRi = 1, manager is behavior coincides with owner is objective for
strict prot-maximization.
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The second type of contract is the Relative Performance, RP , one. Following Miller and
Pazgal (2001; 2002; 2005), under this type of contract, rm is owner compensates his manager
by putting a weight RPi on own prots and a weight (1 RPi ) on the di¤erence between own
prots and the prots of the rival rm, with 0  RPi  1. Under this type of contract,
manager is compensation is given by:
CRPi = 
RP
i i + (1  RPi )(i  j) (3)
The lower the RPi is, the higher is the weight that owner i puts on relative performance,
directing, thus, his manager to become a more aggressive seller in the market. If RPi = 1, the
managers behavior coincides with the owners objective for strict prot-maximization.
To investigate the types of managerial compensation contracts that rmsowners choose
to compensate their managers in equilibrium, we consider a three-stage game with observable
actions, with the following timing. In the rst stage, each rms owner commits to one of the
two types of contracts, D 2 fPR;RPg. In the second stage, each owner sets the respective
managerial incentive parameter Di . In the third stage, managers set output.
An alternative two stage game with observable actions is also considered, according to
which, in the rst stage, each owner chooses both the type of contract D and the respective
managerial incentive parameter Di . In the second stage, managers set output. The latter
captures a situation in which there is no ex-ante commitment over the type of contract that
each owner o¤ers to his manager. The crucial, yet reasonable, assumption here is that the
type of contract and the contract terms that owner i sets are not observable by the rival owner
before contract-setting is everywhere completed. This alternative game helps us to evaluate
the relative importance of strategic commitment on an owners choice of contract type. The
equilibrium concept employed to solve the above games is the subgame perfect equilibrium.
Consider rst the Universal Prot-Revenue, UPR, conguration of contracts. In this case,
both rmsowners commit to a PR contract with which they compensate their managers. In
the third stage, manager i chooses qi to maximize his utility given by eq. (2). Taking the rst
order conditions and solving the system of equations, the output level that manager i sets is:
qPRi (
PR
i ; 
PR
j ) =
A  c(2PRi   PRj )
3
(4)
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From (4), it can be checked that: @q
PR
i
@PRi
< 0 and @q
PR
i
@PRj
> 0. That is, the weight owner i sets
on own prots a¤ects negatively the output level chosen by manager i, while owner js weight
on own prots a¤ects qi positively.
In the second stage, each owner i chooses PRi so as to maximize prots given by:
PRi (
PR
i ; 
PR
j ) =
(A  c(2PRi   PRj ))(A  c(3  PRi   PRj ))
9
(5)
Solving the system of the rst order conditions, we obtain equilibrium managerial incentive
parameters, output levels and prots:
PRi =
 A+ 6c
5c
; qPRi =
2(A  c)
5
; PRi =
2(A  c)2
25
: (6)
Second, the Universal Relative Performance conguration, URP; of contracts is examined.
In this case, both rmsowners commit to an RP contract with which they compensate their
managers. In the third stage, manager i chooses qi to maximize his utility given by eq. (3).
Solving the system of the rst order conditions, the output level that manager i sets is:
qRPi (
RP
i ; 
RP
j ) =
(A  c) (2  RPi )
4  RPi RPj
(7)
From (7), note that @q
RP
i
@RPi
< 0 and @q
RP
i
@RPj
> 0. That is, the higher the weight owner i sets on
own prots, the lower the output level chosen by manager i, while the higher owner js weight
on own prots, the higher the output chosen by manager i.
In the second stage, each owner i chooses RPi so as to maximize prots given by:
RPi (
RP
i ; 
RP
j ) =
(A  c)2  2  RPi  RPi 1  RPj + RPj 
4  RPi RPj
2 (8)
Solving the system of rst order conditions, we obtain the equilibrium managerial incentive
parameters, output levels and prots:
RPi =
2
3
; qRPi =
3(A  c)
8
; RPi =
3(A  c)2
32
: (9)
Finally, the Coexistence conguration of contracts is investigated. Without loss of general-
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ity, owner i commits to compensate his manager with a PR contract, while owner j commits
to an RP contract. In the third stage, manager i (j) chooses qi (qj) to maximize his utility
given by eq. (2) ((3)). Solving the system of the rst order conditions, output levels are:
qpri (
pr
i ; 
rp
j ) =
A+ c(1  2pri )
4  rpj
(10)
qrpj (
pr
i ; 
rp
j ) =
A(2  rpj )  c(2  pri rpj )
4  rpj
(11)
As above, the weight an owner sets on own prots a¤ects negatively the output level
chosen by his manager, while the rival owner weight on own prots a¤ects it positively (it can
be checked that @q
pr
i
@pri
< 0;
@qrpj
@pri
> 0; and
@qrpj
@rpj
< 0;
@qpri
@rpj
> 0).
In the second stage, owners set the incentive parameters so as to maximize prots given
by:
pri (
pr
i ; a
rp
j ) =
[A  c(2pri   1)]
h
A  c

3  2pri   rpj + pri rpj
i

4  rpj
2 (12)
rpj (
pr
i ; 
rp
j ) =
h
A

2  rpj

  c

2  pri rpj
i h
A  c

3  2pri   rpj + pri rpj
i

4  rpj
2 (13)
Solving the system of the rst order conditions, we obtain the equilibrium managerial
incentive parameters, output levels and prots:
pri = 1; q
pr
i =
A  c
4
; pri =
(A  c)2
16
(14)
rpj = 0; q
rp
j =
A  c
2
; rpj =
(A  c)2
8
(15)
Using the equilibrium prots expressions under the UPR, URP and coexistence of both
contracts congurations, it is easy to check that, in the rst stage, each rms owner will opt
for a RP contract. Hence, the Universal Relative Performance contract conguration emerges
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in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the three-stage game.6,7
On the other hand, in the two stage game where owners are unable to commit to a specic
contract type, before setting its respective contract terms, multiple equilibria arise regarding
the type (and the terms) of contract that each owner chooses.8 Using the Pareto criterion for
equilibrium selection, owners would realize that it is in their mutual interest to move towards
the equilibrium that ensures them the highest prots, that is, the URP contract conguration
equilibrium. Thus, it is expected that in the two stage game too, each owner will choose to
compensate his manager with an RP contract.
We concentrate now on the hypotheses which will be tested with our experimental design.
We begin by considering the ownerscontract type choices with which they will compensate
their managers. Our theoretical analysis predicts universal adoption of RP contracts in both
the 2-stage and 3-stage games.
However, if coordination on one of multiple equilibria in the 2-stage game requires too
much in terms of ownersrationality, we would expect a higher frequency of RP contracts in
the 3-stage game. Otherwise, RP contracts should be adopted in both games with similar
frequencies.
Thus, from a practical point of view, comparing the 2-stage and 3-stage games allows us
to evaluate the role of strategic commitment to a contract type before choosing its respective
terms. The above lead to the following hypothesis that will be tested experimentally:
HYPOTHESIS 1: (H1.1) Relative Performance contracts will be preferred by owners
over Prot-Revenue ones and (H1.2) The frequency of Relative Performance contracts will
be lower (higher) in the absence (presence) of ownerscommitment over the contract type
6For further details see Manasakis et al. (2010). The intuition behind this result goes as follows: An RP
contract makes a managers behavior less susceptible to strategic manipulation by rival managers. Less scope
for strategic manipulation gives to the rival owner less reason to provide incentives for aggressive behavior to
his manager. This implies that the owner who chooses the RP contract for his manager obtains competitive
advantage in the market, for any contract choice of the rival owner. This, in turn, makes the selection of an RP
contract each owners best response to whatever the rival owners choice is.
7Note that if both owners set the managerial incentive parameters equal to 1, equilibrium output level and
prots are qNi =
(A c)
3
and Ni =
(A c)2
9
; respectively. In the strategy space of Huck et al. (2004), this is
equivalent to the No-Delegation case where owners themselves decide over the output levels. It is easy to
check that output (prots) set under any of the managerial compensation contracts discussed above is higher
(lower) than that set in the No-Delegation case. Intuitively, owner i, by using a managerial compensation
contract strategically, directs his manager to a more aggressive behavior in order to force the rival manager
to reduce output. Because both owners act in the same way at the games contract stage, rms end up in a
prisonersdilemma situation. Naturally, the increased market supply leads to lower prots.
8For a formal proof see Manasakis et al. (2010).
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before choosing its respective contract terms.
Given the above arguments, it is straightforward that the equilibrium contractsmanagerial
incentive parameters should be set at a level such that RP -compensating owners gain higher
prots than the PR-ones. This can be formalized in the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 2: (H2.1) Under universal adoption of each type of contract, Relative
Performance-compensating owners set managerial incentive parameters at a level higher than
that set by Prot-Revenue-compensating owners. (H2.2) In asymmetric contract congurations,
the aforementioned ranking is expected to be reversed. (H2.3) No di¤erence is expected between
the two stage and three stage games.
Firmsoutput is expected to be higher under UPR contracts than under URP contracts.
The opposite ranking holds for rms prots. This explains why the latter equilibrium is
more protable for rmsowners than the former. In asymmetric contract congurations, an
RP -compensated manager sets output at a level higher than that set by his PR-compensated
rival manager. Furthermore, according to expressions (4), (7), (10) and (11), and the follow
up discussion, own output should react negatively to increases in a rms own managerial
incentive parameter and positively to the rival rms incentive parameter, under all contract
congurations. The above can be summarized in the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 3: (H3.1)Compared to the case of Universal Relative Performance con-
tracts, output will be higher under Universal Prot-Revenue contracts. Whenever the two
contract types coexist, an RP -compensated manager is predicted to set output at a level higher
than that set by his PR-compensated rival. (H3.2) A rms output will be higher the lower the
rms own managerial incentive parameter and the higher the rival rms incentive parameter.
3 Experimental design
We have tested the predictions of the theoretical model outlined above in a laboratory exper-
iment.
A total of 144 subjects participated in the sessions. They were volunteers recruited among
2nd and 3rd year students enrolled in the Business and Human Resources degrees at the
Universitat Jaume I (Castellón, Spain) according to standard protocols used in the Laboratori
dEconomia Experimental (LEE). Each session lasted approximately 100 minutes.
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The experiment was organized under two treatments. A total of four 36-subject sessions
were run, two under each treatment. In the rst treatment, labeled as 3-stage game, the choice
of contract type precedes the choice of the managerial incentive parameter. Then, managers set
output. In the second treatment, labeled as 2-stage game, owners choose simultaneously both
the type of contract with which to compensate their managers and the respective managerial
incentive parameter, before managers decide on their rmsoutput. Incentive parameters were
chosen between 0 and 1 (inclusive) using up to two decimal digits, whereas output was chosen
among the integers in the range between 0 and 500. The experiment was programmed using
the z-Tree toolbox (Fischbacher, 2007).
At the beginning of each session written instructions were given to the subjects and each
of them was randomly assigned the role of an owner or a manager. Eighteen owner-manager
pairs, labeled as rms, were randomly formed at the beginning of each session. These pairs were
kept xed throughout the 50 periods of the session in order to encourage the development of a
cooperative relation between the agents who formed each rm. Nine duopolies were randomly
formed in each period in order to preserve the one-shot nature of the market game. In order
to increase the number of completely independent observations per session, matching occurred
within three groups of 6 owner-manager pairs (rms), that is, three independent matching
groups of 12 subjects each. However, this precise detail was not known by the subjects who
had an additional di¢ culty to guess the total group size and assess the likelihood of being re-
matched with the same rm in two di¤erent periods, given that the computer network of the
LEE is installed in two distant rooms between which there is no possibility of visual contact.
No signicant di¤erence was found across matching groups within each treatment and, thus,
data from the same treatment were pooled together. Following this design, a total of three
totally independent observations per session is guaranteed by the fact that strategies and the
history experienced by each subject were never contaminated nor did they contaminate decision
making within the other two matching groups. Therefore, in a very strict statistical sense, our
conclusions are based on behavior within six totally independent groups per treatment.
In order to facilitate learning in the quantity-setting stage, owners could change their
managers compensation contract every 3 periods, during the rst 30 periods and in every
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period, during the last 20 periods.9 Before subjects made their decisions in the second and
third stages of the game they were informed on previous stage actions by other players in the
same market. At the end of each period, each subjects feedback included full information on
strategies and outcomes of all players in the same market. No other decision making aid was
available to them.
The four sessions were run on two dates. The order between the 2-stage and the 3-stage
session was changed across the two dates to minimize the probability that a subject could
anticipate the treatment that would be implemented should any information have been trans-
mitted from one session to another. Each subject participated in one session only. Therefore,
sessions 1 and 4 correspond to the 3-stage treatment, while sessions 2 and 3 belong to the
2-stage treatment.
The total amount spent on subject payo¤s was 2; 739 euros which implies slightly above
19 euros per subject earnings, ranging between 7:3 and 29:6 euros (an owner subject in a
3-stage treatment and an owner-subject in a 2-stage treatment respectively). Subjects in the
3-stage treatment received slightly lower payments than in the 2-stage one (18:7 and 19:3 euros
respectively). An exchange rate of 1 euro per 80; 000 EXCUs was used.
Following closely the contracts studied in the theoretical model, the contract schemes for
the experiment were designed after a series of pilot sessions in order to guarantee that subjects
with di¤erent roles could earn similar expected rewards. In particular, the PR contract took
the following formula: 20:000 EXCUs as a xed salary plus a half of a linear combination
between the prots and the revenues of the rm. The respective formula for the RP contract
was: 20:000 EXCUs as a xed salary plus a half of a linear combination between the rms
prots and the di¤erence between the rms prots and the prots of the rival rm.10
The models parameter values implemented in the experiment were A = 1000 and c =
200. Under this set of parameters, in the Universal PR equilibrium, both owners should set
PRi = 0:2 and managers should set the corresponding equilibrium output levels at q
PR
i = 320.
The respective values in the Universal RP equilibrium are RPi = 0:666 and q
RP
i = 300. The
equilibrium contract terms and output levels when owner i chooses the PR contract while j
9Previously, this format has been e¢ ciently implemented as a learning facilitating device in several experi-
ments on multistage oligopolies such as in Barreda-Tarrazona et al. (2011), Camacho-Cuena et al. (2005) and
Fatás-Juberías et al. (2013).
10For the instructions given to subjects, see the Appendix.
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chooses the RP one are:
h
PRi ; 
RP
j ; q
PR
i ; q
RP
j
i
= [1; 0; 200; 400].
A strict test of the theoretical model should aim at comparing the observed data on contract
types, contract terms and outputs to the aforementioned theoretical predictions. However, real
human agents learn from trial-and-error strategies and may make systematic mistakes due to
a number of reasons.11 Thus, we focus mainly on the test of the predictions provided by the
qualitative hypotheses H1 H3 stated in the previous section.
4 Experimental results
Let us now proceed with the presentation of the experimental results. We begin with the
overall descriptive statistics of our experiment.
4.1 Overall descriptive statistics
Table 1 provides aggregate adoption frequencies for the two contract types. While the ag-
gregation of data does not allow us to test any specic hypothesis, we obtain a rst picture
indicating that RP contracts were adopted in over 70% of the cases in both treatments. We
proceed now with a more detailed analysis of the data taking into account the di¤erent possible
contract congurations arising from the choices of both owners.
11A vast literature has been dedicated to various factors that may be responsible for observed shortcomings
of human behavior in complex environments, such as mis-perception of feedback (Paich and Sterman, 1993;
Sterman, 1994), limitations in subjects learning when exposed to strategic complexity (Richards and Hays,
1998), or multi-task decision making (Kelly, 1995). A number of factors that favor subjects improvement of
performance have, also, been identied. For example, trial-and-error algorithms have been shown to facilitate
convergence of the strategies played by uninformed subjects toward symmetric, full-information equilibrium
predictions, as shown in Garcia-Gallego (1998) for the case of a price-setting oligopoly. While full convergence
near the theoretical benchmark is obtained in the symmetric single-product setting of Garcia-Gallego (1998),
the introduction of multiproduct rms in Garcia-Gallego and Georgantzis (2001) or the asymmetry in Garcia-
Gallego et al. (2004) provide su¢ ciently unfavorable environments for the hypothesis of convergence to the
theoretical prediction to be rejected.
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Table 1: Contract adoption frequencies
Treatment
2-Stage 3-Stage Both
Contract Type* RP PR RP PR RP PR
Relative Frequency 73.3% 26.7% 70.9% 29.1% 72.1 27.9%
* Prot-Revenue Contract =PR, Relative Performace Contract =RP
4.2 Types of contracts and contract congurations
Regarding the total number of occasions in which each contract type was adopted, we nd
that, in both treatments, the frequency of RP adoption was signicantly higher than that
of PR. More specically, RP vs. PR contracts were chosen 1320 vs. 480 times in the 2-
stage treatment and 1277 vs. 523 times in the 3-stage treatment. However, the prediction
of universal adoption of RP contracts is conrmed less frequently than these numbers may
suggest. To see this, we refer to Table 2.
What we are really interested in is to investigate whether the combination of ownerscon-
tract choices is as predicted by the equilibria of the theoretical model. As shown in Table
2, more than half of our experimental duopolies took place under Universal RP contracts.
This holds for both the 2-stage (988=1800 = 54:89%) and the 3-stage (932=1800 = 51:78%)
treatments. Contrary to this, the Universal PR conguration received scarce support (8:22%
for the 2-stage and 9; 89% for the 3-stage). In fact, the frequency of Universal PR is ap-
proximately one fourth of the frequency of Coexistence of the two contract types, PRRP and
RPPR, in the same market12.13
12Hereafter, PRRP indicates the conguration where owner 1 chooses the PR contract and owner 2 chooses
the RP contract. The opposite holds for RPPR.
13A 2 test (p < 0:001) has been used to conrm the signicance of the di¤erence between the aforementioned
observed frequencies and a random distribution of strategy pairs uniformly across the corresponding outcomes
of the game in the contract stage.
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Table 2: Ownerschoices of contract types
Treatment UPR URP PRRP & RPPR
2-stage 8.22% 54.89% 36.89%
3-stage 9.89% 51.78% 38.33%
Total 9.06% 53.33% 37.61%
Note also that rms owners only rarely chose to compensate their managers in a way
directing them to strict own prot maximization. More specically, only in 4% (6%) of the
contracts in the 3-stage (2-stage) treatment, owners set the managerial incentive parameter
equal to one. This result comes in sharp contrast to the experimental evidence of Huck et al.
(2004). They nd that the No-Delegation strategy is chosen with a relative frequency of
more than 66% in all their treatments.
These results clearly conrm Hypothesis H1.1. Furthermore, we nd that the frequency of
RP contracts is not higher in the when owners commit over the contract type before choos-
ing its respective contract terms. This result indicates that the prevalence of the Universal
RP conguration over the Universal PR alternative one can be fully explained by the sub-
jectsselection of the Pareto-superior equilibrium contract types and refutes the importance
of strategic committment over contract types for expaining the prevalence of RP contracts.
Therefore, we can state the following result:
RESULT 1: 1. Under both treatments, Relative Performance contracts are signicantly
more frequent than Prot-Revenue ones (conrming H1.1). 2. The adoption frequency of Rel-
ative Performance contracts does not vary across the 2-stage and 3-stage treatments (rejecting
H1.2).
It is also interesting to see the dynamics of contract adoption frequencies. Figure 1 presents
the evolution of RP contract adoption in the two treatments, starting from below 40% in period
1, and reaching frequencies close to 90% in period 50. Figure 2 presents the same data broken
down by contract combination. Figure 2 shows that in both treatments, Universal PR adoption
represents a small and rather stable proportion of choices. The coexistence of both contracts
decreases over time while Universal adoption of RP contracts increases up to around 3=4 of
the cases.
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Figure 1: Evolution of individual RP contract adoption.
Figure 2: Evolution of Contract Combinations.
4.3 Managerial incentive parameters
Let us now present our ndings regarding ownerschoices of managerial incentive parameters.
We present our evidence in Table 3 and Figure 3.
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Table 3: Ownerschoices of managerial incentive parameters
Conguration UPR URP PRRP RPPR
Predicted  0.200 0.666 1 0
2-stage Mean  0.579 0.471 0.571 0.472
St. dev. 0.242 0.254 0.285 0.247
3-stage Mean  0.611 0.485 0.620 0.485
St. dev. 0.278 0.277 0.292 0.276
Figure 3: Evolution of incentive parameter by contract combination.
Recall that our theoretical analysis predicts PRi = 0:2 and 
RP
i = 0:666. Regarding the
symmetric congurations of contracts, our experimental evidence leads to the following ob-
servations. First, under universal contract adoption in both treatments, the average incentive
parameter set by PR-compensating (RP -compensating) owners was higher (lower) than the
predicted one. This implies that PR-compensating (RP -compensating) ownersintention to-
wards prot-maximization was stronger (weaker) than predicted. Figure 3 shows a dynamic
picture of these observations, depicting observed incentive parameters against their respective
theoretical values (plotted as an horizontal line). No systematic trend is observed in any of
these parameter series, whereas uctuations in the case of universal PR contracts are due to
the small and noisy sample under this conguration.
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In absolute values, the deviation of observed incentive parameters from the respective
predicted equilibrium values for PR contracts was twice the deviation for RP contracts.
Interestingly enough, within each treatment, PR-compensating owners set, on average,
incentive parameters higher than those set by the RP -compensating ones.14 This is in contrast
to the theorys predictions and implies that PR-compensated managers were directed relatively
closer to prot-maximization than RP -compensated ones. Note also that for both contract
types, the di¤erence in incentive parameters across treatments (2-stage vs 3-stage) is not
statistically signicant.15
The evidence regarding the relatively higher managerial incentive parameters set by PR-
compensating owners can be rationalized as follows: PR-compensating owners, anticipating
the erce market competition that their contract choices would give rise to, might realize that it
is in their mutual interest to direct their managers towards a relatively less aggressive behavior
(higher PRi ), so as to increase their prots. Thus, in order to mitigate this Stackelberg
warfare, they set relatively high managerial incentive parameters, directing their managers to
a less aggressive behavior than RP -compensating owners did.
In asymmetric congurations, our theory predicts that the PR-compensating owner sets
PRi = 1 and theRP - one sets 
RP
j = 0. Regarding the asymmetric contract congurations, our
experimental evidence leads to the following three observations. First, under both treatments,
the average incentive parameter set by PR-compensating (RP -compensating) owners was lower
(higher) than the predicted one. Second, as in the symmetric contract congurations, in mixed
contract schemes too,PR-compensating owners set, on average, incentive parameters higher
than those set by the RP -compensating ones.16 This holds for both treatments, it is in line
with the theoretical models prediction, and implies that RP -compensated managers were
directed relatively closer to prot-maximization than PR-compensated ones. Third, for both
14Within each treatment, the di¤erence in incentive parameters across contract types is signicant, as shown
by a Mann-Whitney test comparing medians of independent groups (p = 0:033 for the 2-stage treatment and
p = 0:025 for the 3-stage treatment).
15Given a PR contract, the statistical signicance of the di¤erence in incentive parameters across treatments
(2-stage vs 3-stage) is rejected by a Mann-Whitney test comparing the medians of independent groups (p =
0:25). The respective test for an RP contract rejects the statistical signicance of incentive parameters across
treatments too (p = 0:48).
16Within each treatment, the di¤erence in incentive parameters across contract types is signicant, as shown
by a Mann-Whitney test comparing medians of independent groups (p = 0:038 for the 2-stage treatment and
p = 0:019 for the 3-stage treatment).
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contract types, the di¤erence in incentive parameters across treatments (2-stage vs. 3-stage)
is not statistically signicant. In fact, the incentive parameters in the asymmetric contract
structures are very close to those reported in the symmetric contract congurations.17
The most striking pattern observed in the evidence reported so far is that given a contract
type, owners set very similar incentive parameters across treatments. More specically, PR-
compensating owners x PRi around 0:57   0:62, while RP -compensating owners x RPi
around 0:47  0:48. In fact, these values do not depend on the contract type used by the rival
owner or on the rival owners contract observability (3-stage treatment vs. 2-stage treatment).
While the observed incentive parameters deviate from their corresponding theoretical values18,
some of the predictions contained in Hypothesis 2 are conrmed. More specically:
RESULT 2: 1. The prediction of the theory (H2.1) concerning the relatively higher incen-
tive parameters (i.e., lower aggressiveness) set by Relative Performance-compensating owner
pairs, over Prot-Revenue compensating owner pairs, is not conrmed, whereas the prediction
(H2.2) concerning the relatively lower incentive parameters (i.e., higher aggressiveness) set by
Relative Performance-compensating owners, over their Prot-Revenue rivals, is conrmed. 2.
The managerial incentive parameter set by an owner is independent of the contract used by the
rival owner and of whether the rival owners contract was observed or not before the contract
terms were chosen (conrming H2.3).
4.4 Output levels
Finally, we focus on the e¤ects of contract types and managerial incentive parameters on output
levels. Table 4 presents descriptive statistics.
Recall that our theoretical results predict qRPi = 300 and q
PR
i = 320 in the two symmetric
congurations, while when owner i chooses the PR contract and j chooses the RP one, the
prediction is: qPRi = 200 and q
RP
j = 400. As shown in Table 4, for both symmetric con-
tract congurations, the output levels set in the experiment exceed our equilibria predictions,
17The signicance of the corresponding di¤erences is rejected by the respective Mann-Whitney tests obtaining
p  values such that p > 0:5 in all cases.
18For both symmetric congurations, there is a systematic deviation of observed incentive parameters from
the respective predicted equilibrium values, upwards for Prot-Revenue contracts and downwards for Relative
Performance contracts. For asymmetric congurations, there is a systematic deviation of observed incentive pa-
rameters from the respective predicted equilibrium values, downwards for Prot-Revenue contracts and upwards
for Relative Performance contracts.
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whereas, for asymmetric congurations, this is true only for PR-compensated managers. In
fact, in asymmetric congurations, RP -compensated managers set quantities well below the
corresponding equilibrium level. Therefore, the deviations of output from equilibrium can-
not be uniformly attributed to some subject-specic bias or the framing of our setup as a
competitive market environment.19 Furthermore, comparing overall output levels with output
corresponding to the subgame perfect equilibria may be misleading because it ignores that
conditional optimality of output choices must be viewed with respect to the actual decisions
in the preceding stages.
Table 4: Managerschoices on output levels
Conguration UPR URP PRRP RPPR
Predicted q 320 300 200 400
2-stage Mean q 364.608 358.725 359.241 346.271
St. dev. 106.741 98.922 95.029 93.334
3-stage Mean q 347.905 359.505 343.177 355.357
St. dev. 99.829 90.662 94.548 87.498
In Table 5 we present the average deviation of the incentive parameter from its equilibrium
prediction, as well as the absolute and relative deviations of output and prot from the corre-
sponding equilibria conditional on the observed incentive parameters. Contrary to Harrisons
(1989) at max" critique, according to which objective functions may be too at near the op-
timum to give an informative feedback to subjects, we observe that even moderate deviations
from equilibrium output have caused signicant deviations from the corresponding equilibrium
prots. Even in the most frequently observed conguration of URP , a relatively high prot
loss of 59% is observed under both treatments, despite the fact that the relative deviation of
quantity is the lowest (13-14%) among all contract congurations. This implies that man-
agers may have attributed some exceptionally low earnings to the contracts they had been
o¤ered rather than to their own wrong decisions or to their interaction with other managers
in the market. Subsequently, the ownersdecisions have also diverged from the corresponding
19This could have been the e¤ect of using the word rival" when referring to the other rm or the explicit
encouragement to maximize own prot in the instructions.
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equilibrium incentive parameters due to the noisy choices of managers and the little number
of observations under some contract congurations. We consider as evidence in favor of this
conjecture the fact that deviations of the incentive parameter from the corresponding equilib-
rium values have been smaller in the case of URP , which has occurred more frequently, giving
owners more feedback from past actions.
Table 5: Average deviation from equilibrium choices conditional on alpha
2-Stage 3-Stage
Deviation UPR URP PRRP RPPR UPR URP PRRP RPPR
alpha* () 0.37 -0.19 -0.42 0.47 0.41 -0.18 -0.38 0.48
quantity (q) 69.8 35.5 82.4 34.2 55.2 38.8 70.8 51.5
relative deviation 25% 13% 31% 14% 21% 14% 28% 20%
Firm  (in 000s) -48.0 -28.7 -26.9 -38.2 -36.2 -27.8 -27.4 -36.1
relative deviation -77% -59% -50% -61% -56% -59% -51% -55%
* The observed deviation in alpha is with respect to the SPNE alpha.
Figure 4 depicts output dynamics within each contract combination. Apart from the afore-
mentioned divergence from theoretical predictions, we observe that output levels exhibit per-
sistent oscillations over the 50 periods of the experiment.
Figure 4: Evolution of quantity by contract combination.
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A remaining question concerns the response of output to a given contract and a specic
incentive parameter. Panel data analysis is a useful tool for dealing with the temporal and
individual dimensions of our experimental data. We report here the results of a Prais and
Winsten correlated panel regression for quantity. A Hausman 2(11) test value of 5.78 does
not allow us to reject that the di¤erence in the coe¢ cients is not systematic, hence we use a
random e¤ects model.
Using a test for serial correlation, we reject the null of no autocorrelation: 2(1)=25.65.
Moreover, due to the fact that we grouped the rms into matching groups where they play
against each other, there will be contemporaneous correlation e¤ects.
The presence of heterogeneity, autocorrelation, and contemporaneous correlation in our
data drives us to choose a panel corrected standard errors estimation method with a panel
specic AR(1) structure of the form:
quantityit = 0 + 1  alphait + 2  other_alphait + "it; (16)
where "it = i  "it 1.
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 95% Conf. Interval
constant 373.34 5.89 63.42 0.000 [361.80, 384.88]
upr -32.63 17.52 -1.86 0.063 [-66.97, 1.72]
prrp -4.44 12.61 -0.35 0.725 [-29.15, 20.26]
rppr -26.10 10.38 -2.51 0.012 [-46.45, -5.75]
alpha -27.99 8.67 -3.23 0.001 [-44.98, -10.99]
alpha upr 46.33 23.91 1.94 0.053 [-0.52, 93.19]
alpha prrp -2.99 16.96 -0.18 0.860 [-36.23, 30.25]
alpha rppr 16.81 13.75 1.22 0.221 [-10.14, 43.77]
oth alpha -12.54 7.08 -1.77 0.077 [-26.41, -1.34]
oth alpha upr 13.41 21.95 0.61 0.541 [-29.60, 56.42]
oth alpha prrp 15.99 14.47 1.11 0.269 [12.36, 44.36]
oth alpha rppr 18.95 13.35 1.42 0.156 [-7.22, 45.11]
Table 6: Prais-Winsten regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs) for Quantity.
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Group variable: rmid; Time variable: period; Number of obs = 3,600; Number of groups = 72;
Panels: correlated (balanced); Autocorrelation: panel-specic AR(1); Obs. per group: 50; Estimated
covariances = 2,628; Estimated autocorrelations = 72; Estimated coe¢ cients = 12; R2 = 0.57; Wald
2(11) = 25.62; Prob > 2 = 0.0074; i = 0.389, 0.308, 0.450, 0.426, 0.377, ..., 0.350.
Table 6 presents the estimates of a model in which output choice is explained by own and
rival incentive parameters for each contract combination. The basic contract conguration is
Universal RP because it was the most frequently observed. Hence, constant, alpha, and other
alpha refer to this conguration, while all other estimated parameters measure the size and
signicance of the di¤erence in the parameters estimated with respect to this basic cong-
uration. The results conrm that output reacts to the incentive parameter in the expected
way: as the incentive parameter increases, inducing managers to focus more on own prot,
output choices become less aggressive. In fact, the estimated coe¢ cient (-27.98, p=0.001) does
not signicantly vary across di¤erent contract congurations.20 Therefore, the more manager
incentives depend on their rmsprots, the lower the quantity they set.
With regard to the predicted e¤ect (second part of H3.2) of the rivals incentive parameter
on a rms output choice, we obtain no signicant evidence.
The estimated model can also help us address the rst part of the third hypothesis concern-
ing the ranking of output choices across di¤erent contract congurations. We observe that the
hypothesis is rejected, especially because in mixed contract congurations, RP -compensated
managers set (alphas being equal) signicantly lower output than their PR-compensated rivals
(-26.10, p=0.012).
In fact, output has, generally speaking, been invariant to alternative contract congura-
tions. These results suggest an overall rejection of Hypothesis 3.1.
This may be a consequence of poor learning in the nal stage of the game due to noisy
feedback from the two preceding stages.
Summarizing the aforementioned discussion on output reactions to contract types and terms
we state:
RESULT 3: Output has reacted in the expected way to the terms of a rms own contract
20For Universal PR, we have very few observations and the di¤erence in the coe¢ cients is not signicant at
5%.
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(conrming the rst part of H3.2). Other reactions do not systematically follow the pattern
predicted by H3.
5 Concluding Remarks
The experimental approach adopted here allows us to build a bridge between the standard
neoclasical approach to oligopoly delegation and behavioral data from a population of human
agents who have certainly not used any explicit optimization rule, but rather, a noisy learning
from trial-and-error. The most important of our ndings can be generalized to state that some
of the predictions obtained under the assumption of perfect foresight and unlimited calculus
capacity are robust to the noise created by interacting learning agents.
With respect to the specic framework studied here, our main nding is that Relative Per-
formance contracts were more frequently chosen by owners than Prot-Revenue ones, a result
which is in line with the theory. Moreover, the prevalence of RP contracts can be fully ex-
plained by the rms ownersselection of the Pareto superior equilibrium contracts, and thus, it
does not depend on whether rmsowners can commit, or not, to specic contract types before
choosing their respective terms. Our experimental evidence further suggests that, in contrast
to the theoretical prediction, in symmetric contract congurations, PR-compensating own-
ers direct their managers relatively closer to prot-maximization than the RP -compensating
owners do. In line with the theory, the same phenomenon occurs under asymmetric contract
congurations. Finally, output levels set in the experiment tend to exceed their theoretical
predicted values. Hence, managerial contracts and incentive parameters chosen by the rms
owners result in a Stackelberg warfare ercer than what the theory predicts.
Our results indicate that deviation from prot maximization succesfully induces a more
aggressive output setting behavior. Further, the pro-competitive role of relative performance-
based incentives is recognized and appropriately used by rm owners wishing to gain a compet-
itive advantage in the market. In fact, this nding is particularly interesting for both theory
and decision making by rms in the real world, because it is obtained in a far more realistic
environment than that of fully rational players assumed in theory. Equally interesting for
both theorists and decision makers is the non signicance of revealing the contract type before
choosing the contract terms. Thus, the positive e¤ect of relative performance-based rewards
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on rmsprots is su¢ cient for this type of contracts to prevail over the prot-revenue alterna-
tive. Given that it is usually impossible to identify the e¤ects of di¤erent strategic variables on
specic stages of the decision making process, our experiment constitutes a unique source of ev-
idence on specic predictions of oligopoly delegation theories. The noise in the quantity-setting
stage has added a further challenge on the assumptions of the theory. In such a framework,
the adoption of relative performance incentives and the e¤ectiveness of the contract term pa-
rameter to induce more aggressive market behavior are particularly positive ndings regarding
the links between the theory and more complex environments with real human agents.
In the present paper we restricted attention to contracts combining either own prots and
revenues or own prots and relative performance. Yet, there is evidence suggesting that CEO
compensation is linked with own market share (Peck, 1988; Borkowski, 1999). Ritz (2008) and
Jansen et al. (2007) formalize contracts combining own prots and own market share. Thus,
an interesting direction for future experimental research could be to expand the rms owners
strategy space by allowing them to compensate their managers with contracts combining own
prots and own market share as well.
6 Appendix: Experiment instructions (translated from Span-
ish)
6.1 Owner Instructions (2-stage treatment)
Your decisions in this experiment will help us study human behavior in specic economic con-
texts. The experiment is nanced by public research funds. Read these instructions carefully,
taking into account that a better understanding of the decision making context will help you
earn more money and generate more reliable and, thus, useful data.
You are the owner of one of the two rms selling a given product. You will delegate the
output decision of your rm to a manager whom you have hired for this purpose.
You will have to decide on the compensation method which your rm will adopt to remu-
nerate your rms manager. Your decisions in each period will become public information to
all agents involved in the same market before output decisions are made. Managers will have
to take these decisions as given and then x their rms output. Contracts may be of the
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following types:
Contract Type 1: 20.000 experimental currency units (EXCUs) as a xed salary plus half
of a linear combination between the rms prots and the rms revenues.
C1 = 20000 +
1
2
 ( + (1  ) Revenue)
Choosing the value of alpha you can vary the weight given by your rm to each of these
two objectives (prot and revenue) in the variable compensation of the rms manager.
Contract Type 2: 20.000 experimental currency units (EXCUs) as a xed salary plus half
of a linear combination between the rms prots and the di¤erence between your rms and
the rivals prots.
C2 = 20000 +
1
2
 ( + (1  )  [ other])
Choosing the value of alpha you can vary the weight given by your rm to each of these two
objectives (prot and di¤erence in prots) in the variable compensation of the rms manager.
When choosing the contract terms you should take into account that your earnings will be:
a xed amount of 20.000 EXCUs plus the rms prot.
The market will take place for 50 subsequent periods. In each one of them, following your
choice of contract and that of the rival rms owner managers will make output decisions
simultaneously choosing output levels between 0 and 500 product units. You may change your
managers compensation method every 3 periods during the rst 30 periods and every period
after period 30.
The manager of your rm will be randomly assigned to you once and will be kept xed
throughout the experiment. In each period, you will form a market with a (di¤erent) single
rival rm which will be chosen randomly among the rms formed by the participants of this
experiment in the same way as your rm.
Your objective is to maximize your cumulative compensation. The more EXCUs you earn
the higher will be your payment in cash at the end of the session. We give you a xed initial
payment of 100.000 EXCUs which will be added to your earnings from the experiment. The
exchange rate is 1 euro for every 80,000 EXCUs.
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Only for the 3-stage treatment: You and the owner of the rival rm will rst know the
contract chosen by each one of you and then you will decide on the value of alpha. Only after
these two decisions have been made by owners, the managers receive information on contract
types and incentive parameters chosen in order to make their rms output decisions.
Thank you for your participation and remember that, once these instructions are read, any
communication or action which is not controlled by the organizers is prohibited until payments
in cash have been made at the end of the experiment.
6.2 Manager Instructions (both treatments)
Your decisions in this experiment will help us study human behavior in specic economic con-
texts. The experiment is nanced by public research funds. Read these instructions carefully,
taking into account that a better understanding of the decision making context will help you
earn more money and generate more reliable and, thus, useful data.
You are the manager of one of the two rms selling a product in the market. The owner of
the rm has hired you in order to delegate to you the decisions concerning the output of the
rm.
The method with which you will be compensated which you will have to take as given may
be of either type:
Contract Type 1: 20.000 experimental currency units (EXCUs) as a xed salary plus half
of a linear combination between the rms prots and the rms revenues.
C1 = 20000 +
1
2
 ( + (1  ) Revenue)
By choosing the value of alpha, the owner can vary the weight given to each one of the two
aforementioned objectives in the variable part of your compensation.
Contract Type 2: 20.000 experimental currency units (EXCUs) as a xed salary plus half
of a linear combination between the rms prots and the di¤erence between your rms and
the rivals prots.
C2 = 20000 +
1
2
 ( + (1  )  [ other])
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By choosing the value of alpha, the owner can vary the weight given to each one of the two
aforementioned objectives in the variable part of your compensation.
When receiving this information you should have in mind that the owners earnings will be
a xed amount of 20.000 EXCUs plus the rms prot.
The market will take place during 50 periods in each one of which you will have to make the
decision of your rms output. The contract concerning your compensation may be changed
every three periods during the rst 30 periods and every period after period 30.
You will be assigned to a rms owner who will be randomly chosen once at the beginning
of the experiment. This matching will be kept constant throughout the session. The rm with
which your rm will be matched to form a market will be determined randomly in each period
among the rest of the rms formed by the participants in this session in the same way as your
rm.
Your objective is to maximize your cumulative compensation. The more EXCUs you earn
the higher will be your payment in cash at the end of the session. We give you a xed initial
payment of 100.000 EXCUs which will be added to your earnings from the experiment. The
exchange rate is 1 euro for every 80,000 EXCUs.
Thank you for your participation and remember that, once these instructions are read, any
communication or action which is not controlled by the organizers is prohibited until payments
in cash have been made at the end of the experiment.
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